Current Projects: GC2S2 is developing a significant health and nutrition project for the Kampala, Uganda region. Our objectives are 1) focusing on establishing health clinics with traveling nurses and doctors to address the lack of access to medical care in rural or slum areas, 2) developing a nutrition plan for educational institutions for young students (children), and 3) providing family planning services and feminine hygiene products to women and young girls to assist with keeping young women in school, in addition to ensuring mothers have access to the care needed both pre and postpartum.
Written by Matthew Ko
Background
The overwhelming prevalence of Iranian influence on Iraqi political parties is far more extensive than many people realize.
Iran has held significant influence in Iraq by funding local political parties and the Popular Mobilization Forces militias. Since 2022, these political parties have taken control of Iraq’s legislative body and expanded their control of many governmental organizations. This control serves Iran’s interests and threatens to spread regional instability.
Before the toppling of Saddam Hussein, Iran and Iraq were geopolitical rivals. Iran, a country of Shi’a Islam, tried to spread its ideals into Iraq, which was nominally secular but Sunni-dominated. In 1980, their rivalry caused Saddam to invade Iran and start the Iran-Iraq War.
The war ended in a bloody stalemate with approximately one million people dead or injured. The war left both in dire economic straits, and the debt incurred by Iraq caused the invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf War. The Gulf War ended in defeat for Iraq by Western-led Coalition forces, further weakening its geopolitical position and causing its isolation by the West. Kurdish and Shi’ite groups, believing there was an opportunity to overthrow Saddam, revolted in March 1991.
However, the unwillingness of Coalition forces to advance further into Iraq led to the revolts being put down by Saddam’s forces in April that same year.
The 2003 American invasion of Iraq toppled Saddam’s regime. This removal was an opportunity for Iran to spread its influence in the historically Sunni-dominated Iraq. Iran took advantage of the power vacuum caused by Saddam’s fall by supporting and funding Iraqi Shi’a militias, known as Muqawama, and Iraq’s Shi’a political parties. Militias founded and financed by Iran include Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and Saraya al-Salam.
Eventually, the violence petered out, but Iran’s influence was solidified by this point, with Iran influencing Iraq through the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, the Badr Organization, the Dawa Party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Many of these groups, alongside Shi’a militias, formed a bloc called the Coordination Framework (CF).
Iran’s influence was further strengthened by the rise of ISIS. The Muqawama, as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), played an important role in the subsequent war against ISIS, contributing between 100,000 and 150,000 fighters. Victory over ISIS in 2018 ended ISIS as a proto-state, but the undeniable support the militias provided to the fight against ISIS gave the Muqawama legitimacy and funding from the Iraqi government, indirectly giving Iran a stronger grasp in Iraq.
The Muqawama and their parties (and, by extension, Iran) suffered temporary setbacks for a few years after 2018, with electoral, battlefield, and public relations defeats complicating their efforts to influence Iraq. Sustained Iraqi protests against Iranian influence in 2019 caught Iranian-backed forces flat-footed, causing the resignation of Iranian-backed Prime Minister Adel Abd’al-Mahdi.
Mustafa al-Kadhimi replaced Abdul-Mahdi and cracked down on the PMF and their component militias. Muqawama strikes against American forces caused the US to retaliate, assassinating Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian Quds Force general who coordinated the training and arming of the Muqawama. This assassination adversely impacted Iran’s influence to influence Iraq, as Iran-backed militias across the Middle East through the Quds Force. Muqawama-backed parties then performed poorly in the 2021 elections and failed to block the election results.
The electoral success of an alliance of Sadrists, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Iraqi Communist Party, and other pro-reform parties eroded the power of the Shi’a political parties and threatened to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq. Iran-backed factions struck back in 2022 through a shift in tactics. They began to utilize the legal system controlled by Iran-backed judges to regain influence.
Iraq’s top court, the Federal Supreme Court, replaced a longstanding requirement for a two-thirds majority vote with a two-thirds quorum requirement, meaning that two-thirds of all legislators, rather than two-thirds of cast votes, are needed to form a government. This move allowed the CF to roadblock Iraq’s government despite being in the minority.
This victory was compounded by the Sadrists, one of the few Shi’a rivals to the CF and the biggest winner of the 2021 elections at 73 out of 329 seats, withdrawing from parliament. This withdrawal allowed Iran-aligned factions to gain control of parliament and select a prime minister, allowing the CF to take control of the Iraqi government. While the CF-affiliated factions lack legitimacy amongst the electorate, they continue to use the legal system to solidify their current gains and silence critics.
The Current Situation
Iraq’s parliament is currently under significant sway from Iran-backed factions. Legislation that aims to solidify CF’s political gains has proven to be unpopular, but the Coordination Framework has continued to remain in power through its tight control of multiple government bodies. Examples include the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, the Communications and Media Commission, the Interior Ministry, anti-corruption bodies, and Iraq’s Supreme Court.
Their control of the Communications and Media Commission and Iraq’s Supreme Court is particularly concerning. Control of the former allows the suppression of dissident opinions in Iraq, while control of the latter allows CF to drive the political processes of Iraq further towards the favor of Iranian-backed factions. Taken together, Iran holds extensive amounts of influence in Iraq’s government and its constituent parts.
The CF has also used its control of the Iraqi government to reinforce the power of its militias. The CF accomplished this by the 2022 formation of the Muhandis General Company. This company is owned entirely by the PMF, who are manned and controlled by Iran-backed militias. The authority of this Company is extremely vast; not only can it work in any sector, but the firm receives free land, state funds, and state-owned enterprises from the Iraqi government.
Furthermore, the Company can construct or demolish buildings without cabinet or parliamentary approval. In theory, the Muhandis General Company, an entity controlled by Iran-backed factions, has extensive funds and power. In practice, the Company’s influence and power is even more extensive.
A PMF force already illegally took a large amount of land from Baghdad, equivalent in size to the US Capitol. The sheer amount of power this Company holds would be extremely concerning in any nation-state, and the fact that the Company is controlled by the PMF, an Iranian-backed entity, makes the authority of this Company a legitimate threat to Iraq’s and the region’s security.
Analysis
Iraqi Instability
Iran’s extensive amounts of influence in Iraq pose dire security concerns for Iraq. The significant amounts of support Iran provides for Shi’a militias and the resulting discrimination against Sunnis threatens to exacerbate sectarian tensions. This can incentivize people to join terrorist groups, increasing violence and instability in the region. This type of sectarian violence played out in the aftermath of Saddam’s fall and contributed to the prominence of ISIS between 2014 and 2018.
If the empowerment of Shi’a militias continues, the breakout of violence is likely, resulting in chaos as Iraq is plunged into conflict. The tight control Iran-backed factions hold over the Iraqi government compounds this issue. The PMF’s Muhandis General Company can appropriate homes, infrastructure, and businesses with zero oversight or legality. This issue can again exacerbate sectarian tensions. If the PMF disproportionately appropriates Sunni-held land and structures, the resultant lack of housing could cause unrest or fuel local terrorist organizations.
Potential Regional Instability
Iran’s influence over Iraq could also lead to regional instability. Iran’s backing of Iraqi militias and political parties is one part of Iran’s aim of increasing its regional influence. If Iran gains enough influence in Iraq, Iran would likely have a much easier time supporting its proxies across the Middle East, fueling terrorism. Additionally, the nature of Iran’s proxies is such that they could simultaneously try to destabilize multiple regions at the same time, including Iraq.
This has a likely chance of causing a dramatic humanitarian crisis and mass migration. This mass migration is particularly concerning since many Arabs remain displaced from the battles against ISIS. Additionally, the aforementioned Iran-backed sectarian discrimination and violence and the recruitment of disaffected Sunni Arabs and other marginalized groups by terrorists will probably lead to the displacement of millions, leading to another migration crisis in Europe and the Middle East.
Displacement caused by the war on ISIS has led to the marginalization of Sunnis, leading to the domination, funding, and favor of the Shi’a militias and political parties within Iraqi politics. Considering that marginalization has led to the prominence of brutal terrorists such as ISIS, the marginalization of Sunni Arabs will almost certainly recreate the conditions that led to ISIS’s rise.
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Bibliography
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